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Abstract
In many real-world applications of machine learning, data are distributed across
many clients and cannot leave the devices they are stored on. Furthermore, each
client’s data, computational resources and communication constraints may be very
different. This setting is known as federated learning, in which privacy is a key
concern. Differential privacy is commonly used to provide mathematical privacy
guarantees. This work, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to consider feder-
ated, differentially private, Bayesian learning. We build on Partitioned Variational
Inference (PVI) which was recently developed to support approximate Bayesian
inference in the federated setting. We modify the client-side optimisation of PVI
to provide an (, δ)-DP guarantee. We show that it is possible to learn moderately
private logistic regression models in the federated setting that achieve similar
performance to models trained non-privately on centralised data.
1 Introduction
In many real-world settings, machine learning practitioners are tasked with learning good models
using data fragmented across a number of clients, such as data held on mobile phones or Internet
of Things devices, or patient data held in different hospitals’ databases. Each client may have large
differences in the distribution of data held, network connectivity, and computational resources. This
problem setting is known as federated learning setting, in which privacy is a key concern. Whilst
federated learning algorithms do not directly communicate locally held data when training their
models, it has been shown that modern trained machine learning models, such as neural networks,
can unintentionally memorise their training examples [1]. When the training data includes highly
sensitive data e.g. when performing drug sensitivity prediction with genomic data [2], it is vital to
protect the privacy of each individual who has contributed their data. Differential privacy (DP) [3]
achieves this by introducing carefully calibrated noise, thus providing individuals with plausible
deniability and admitting mathematical guarantees. In addition to privacy concerns, it is essential to
have accurate uncertainty in predictions, particularly when they are used to make important decisions.
Bayesian inference is one principled approach to reasoning under uncertainty.
This work provides a framework for performing federated, differentially private, Bayesian learning.
To the knowledge of the authors, there has been very limited work in the intersection of these fields.
The Federated Averaging algorithm [4] performs local gradient descent steps to update a shared
model in parallel across a number of clients, and performs an update by performing a weighted
average in which clients with more datapoints are weighted more highly. This algorithm has also
been adapted to be DP [5]. This algorithm does not support more challenging federated settings such
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asynchronous settings where the clients control when communication occurs. Previous work has also
performed differentially private variational inference (an approximate Bayesian algorithm), both for
non-conjugate models [6] and for conjugate-exponential family models [7], but this work has not
considered the federated setting. Bayesian learning on private distributed data has been performed
using standard DP techniques [8], but this is only applicable for exponential conjugate family models.
In this work we use the Partitioned Variational Inference (PVI) algorithm, a recently developed
approach to variational inference that supports federated learning in conjugate and non-conjugate
models, extending it to be differentially private.
2 Background
2.1 Partitioned Variational Inference (PVI)
In global Variational Inference (VI) [9], we seek to find a variational distribution which is close to
the true intractable Bayesian posterior by minimising the KL divergence between the variational
distribution and the true posterior, or equivalently optimising a global free energy.
We now introduce the Partitioned Variational Inference (PVI) algorithm [10]. Consider a parametric
probabilistic model given by the prior p(θ) over the unknown parameters, θ, and likelihood, p(y|θ).
The data, y, is spread across M clients, {y1, . . . ,yM} and each client communicates with a central
parameter server. We use a variational distribution, q(θ), to approximate the true posterior, p(θ|y):
q(θ) = p(θ)
M∏
m=1
tm(θ) ' 1Z p(θ)
M∏
m=1
p(ym|θ) = p(θ|y). (1)
Here tm(θ) will be refined to approximate its corresponding (un-normalised) likelihood, p(ym|θ).
The tm(θ)’s are exponential family distributions, making computation relatively simple, like in global
VI. Instead of optimising the global free energy directly, a set of client-side local optimisations are
performed. The m-th client updates as in Equation 3. The updated approximate likelihood tnewm (θ) is
found by division (see Equation 5), and the change in likelihood factor ∆tm(θ) is communicated
to the parameter server. It can be shown that any fixed point of PVI is a global VI solution [10].
Unlike global VI, PVI maintains an explicit representation of the contribution from each client to the
approximate posterior, and refines it locally. This means it is ideally suited to the federated learning
setting, particularly in inhomogeneously distributed cases.
2.2 Differential Privacy (DP)
Definition 2.1 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy) A randomised algorithm, A, is said to be (, δ) differ-
entially private if for any possible subset of outputs, S, and for all datasets which differ in one entry
only, (D,D′) the following inequality holds [11] :
Pr(A(D ∈ S)) ≤ ePr(A(D′ ∈ S)) + δ. (2)
Additionally, modern techniques rely heavily on privacy amplification by subsampling [12] i.e.,
randomly selecting data-points to contribute in a DP mechanism. Composition techniques enable the
cumulative privacy loss to be tracked when multiple randomised algorithms are applied to a dataset.
One technique for composition is known as the Moments Accountant [13], which provides tight
bounds on the privacy cost and takes into account the privacy amplification effect of subsampling.
The DP-SGD algorithm [14] adapts standard stochastic gradient descent by aggregating gradients
with fixed `2-norm (which may be achieved by gradient rescaling) and injecting noise. See Equation
4. It can be shown that this algorithm is (, δ)-differentially private. We use a similar algorithm to
optimise the PVI local objective function, using Adagrad instead of SGD.
3 Experiments
Method. We consider binary classification on the standard UCI Adult dataset [15] (also considered
in Jälkö et al. [6]) with an 80% : 20% train:test split, predicting whether household income exceeds
$50, 000 based on sensitive factors such as occupation, relationship status and native country, making
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Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Partitioned Variational Inference (DP-PVI)
1: Input: Clients {ym}Mm=1, where ym = {(xi, ti)}Nmi=1. Parameters: minibatch size L, gradient
norm bound C, noise scale σ.
2: Within each client, having received qold(θ) from the global server, optimise:
qnew(θ) = arg min
q(θ)∈Q
KL
(
q(θ)|| 1Z ′
qold(θ)
toldm (θ)
p(ym|θ)
)
. (3)
3: This optimisation is done via Adagrad. At each iteration t, use the Gaussian Mechanism on the
minibatch gradient, subsampling a minibatch of size L (denoted as L):
g˜t =
1
L
∑
i∈L
g(xi)
max
(
1, ‖g(xi)‖2C
) +N (0, σ2C2I)
 . (4)
4: After optimisation, communicate to the global server:
∆tm(θ) =
tnewm (θ)
toldm (θ)
=
qnew(θ)
qold(θ)
. (5)
5: The global server updates q(θ)← q(θ)∆tm(θ).
individual (datapoint) privacy important. We specifically focus on unbalanced distributions of data
across clients. In order to achieve this, we split the clients into one group of smaller clients and
another group of larger clients. We change the proportion of datapoints in each group, and the class
balance of each group (see Appendix C). We also focus on the asynchronous setting, where the
parameter server is not in control of when a client communicates an update. We assume each client
has similar compute power, and thus has update rate inversely proportional to the number of data
points held by that client. In this case, we expect that PVI will outperform global VI, and we show
this in Appendix E.1 for a wide range of dataset distributions.
We perform mean-field PVI using a logistic regression model with a Gaussian prior and variational
distribution (See Appendix B for the full model definition). We use the Gaussian mechanism to
provide a private gradient estimate and apply Adagrad to perform the client-side PVI optimisation
(Equation 3), providing communicated client updates with a DP guarantee (See Appendix A) using
the Moments Accountant to compose privacy guarantees [13]. At each client, we choose δ to be an
order of magnitude lower than the number of locally held data points. The maximum privacy budget
(max) is specified for each client, and a client no longer communicates an update if this budget is
exceeded. We compare DP-PVI with non-private global VI and PVI using gradient ascent.
Results. Fig. 1 shows results for Dataset Distribution C (see Appendices C and D for the data set
distribution settings and hyperparameter settings respectively)2. Each algorithm is run on 5 randoms
seeds and the mean and standard deviation of results reported. As expected, we find that non-private
PVI outperforms non-private global VI when comparing both held-out log likelihood and test set
accuracy as a function of communication rounds. Not only is each communication between a server
and client more meaningful in PVI, since it has been performed with several update steps, but also
the factorisation of the variational distribution employed in PVI means that smaller clients updating
more frequently should not have an adverse effect. The average gradient size is independent of the
number of data points held by that client for global VI.
We find that the DP-PVI algorithm is able to achieve close to non-private performance for a moderate
privacy guarantee. Furthermore, if we reduce the privacy guarantee by increasing max for each
client, the performance of the algorithm improves slightly. We remark that the training curves for
the DP-PVI algorithm show an increase in performance followed by a small but consistent decrease
in performance near the end of training for all values of max. We believe that the reason for this
behaviour is as follows: as client m updates with probability inversely proportional to Nm, clients
with small Nm update more frequently, meaning they expend their privacy budget earlier on in
training. The decrease in performance is due to clients with large Nm repeatedly updating at the end
2To reproduce the experiments in this paper, please see https://github.com/MrinankSharma/DP-PVI
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Figure 1: Dataset Distribution C (inhomogenous) Results. Left: test set accuracy. Right: test set
average log likelihood. Upper: performance as a function of parameter communications. Note that
the x-axis scale is different for global VI and PVI. Lower: privacy-utility tradeoff. PVI (and DP-PVI)
performs significantly better than global VI in terms of test set accuracy and performance. DP-PVI
with moderate privacy guarantees achieves performance similar to non-private PVI. Increasing max
improves performance as each client is able to participate in additional communication rounds. See
Appendix E for results obtained on alternative dataset distributions.
of training, and since these clients are not representative of the over all data distribution, we see a
corresponding decrease in performance.
The results for alternative data distributions are in Appendix E. The DP-PVI algorithm attains a
significantly better accuracy and held out log-likelihood than the non-private global VI approach,
except for the homogeneous case where the performance is similar. In all cases DP-PVI requires
substantially fewer communication rounds. Moreover, global VI on homogeneous data is equivalent
to centralised VI, representing gold-standard performance. In this context, the worst case test set
accuracy and average log likelihood of DP-PVI is 81.83% and −0.4218 (Dataset C, max = 0.5)
which is similar to centralised VI’s performance of 85.21% and −0.3184.
4 Conclusions
In this work we introduce a first of its kind method for performing differentially private, federated,
Bayesian learning by augmenting the client side optimisations in PVI to yield an (, δ)-DP guarantee.
We find that this technique achieves similar performance to the current non-private state-of-the-art
method (PVI), while providing moderate privacy guarantees.
The approach taken here is appropriate when each individual contributes only one datapoint in total,
which is the precisely the scenario for the UCI Adult data set. However, client level differential
privacy may be more natural when the data from each client corresponds to one individual only, and
4
this would consider adjacent data sets to be those which differ in the data of one client only. We
believe that this will be a fruitful direction for future work.
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Figure 2: Threat model assumed by the DP-PVI algorithm.
Fig. 2 shows the threat model implied by the DP-PVI algorithm. Since the updates produced by each
client are individually protected by an (, δ) guarantee with an appropriate value of δ, the algorithm
does not require secure transmission protocols, nor does it assume that each client contributing data is
trustworthy or that the central parameter server is genuine. This is a useful situation, and each client
is in direct control of the privacy of their own data.
B Model Definition
We consider the problem of binary classification. Client m holds data ym = {(xi, ti)}Nmi=1 where
xm ∈ Rd and ti ∈ {−1,+1}. The model is defined by:
P (ti|xi,w) = σ(tiwTxi), (6)
where σ(·) is the logistic function i.e.,
σ(z) =
1
1 + exp(−z) (7)
A Gaussian prior is placed on the weights, w.
P (w) = N (w|µw,Σw) (8)
The variational distribution applied is a mean-field multivariate Gaussian:
q(w) = N (w|µq,Σq), (9)
where Σq is a diagonal matrix. We approximate the posterior predictive distribution by using the
Probit approximation [16]:
p(t∗ = 1|x∗,y) =
∫
p(t∗ = 1|x∗,w)p(w|y) dw (10)
' σ
(
µTq x
∗√
1 + pix∗TΣqx∗/8
)
(11)
7
This approximation is directly used to compute the likelihood of each datapoint. Accuracy is
computed by classifying all datapoints with p(t∗ = 1|x∗,y) > 0.5 as having label 1.
C Dataset Distribution Scheme
The UCI Adult dataset is distributed across M = 10 clients in this work, and the degree of inho-
mogeneity is controlled by parameters κ, which controls the client class imbalance, and ρ, which
controls the client size imbalance. Recall that the task considered is binary classification, and denote
the fraction of the majority class in the data (which will be distributed) as λ. For the UCI Adult
dataset, λ = 0.76. We used the following procedure to distribute the data across the clients.
1. Let half of the clients be ‘small’ clients and the remaining half be ‘large’ clients.
2. Use ρ to determine target client sizes.
Nsmall =
⌊Ntotal
M
(1− ρ)
⌋
. Nlarge =
⌊Ntotal
M
(1 + ρ)
⌋
. (12)
b·c denotes the floor operation. Thus ρ ∈ (0, 1) where ρ = 0 means that the small and large
clients are of the same size, and ρ = 1 gives small clients having no data.
3. Use κ to determine the target majority class fraction on each client type.
λtargetsmall = λ+ (1− λ) · κ. (13)
Since λ refers to the fraction of the majority class, κ > 1 decreases the number of minority
class labels on the small clients and vice versa. Note that κ may be negative, and its domain
depends on λ.
Note that not all combinations of κ and ρ are valid; for example, the data-set may not contain
sufficient minority class examples.
Identifier ρ κ Small Clients Large Clients
Nm Proportion +ve δ Nm Proportion +ve δ
A 0 0 3907 ∼ 24% 10−4 3907 ∼ 24% 10−4
B 0.9 0.95 390 ∼ 1.3% 10−3 7424 ∼ 25% 10−4
C 0.7 −3 1172 ∼ 96% 10−4 6642 ∼ 11% 10−4
D 0.6 −1.5 1562 ∼ 60% 10−4 6251 ∼ 15% 10−4
Table 1: Dataset distributions generated by controlling parameters ρ and κ, and resulting values of δ
applied.
D Hyperparameter Settings
D.1 PVI Hyperparameter settings
Hyperparameter Description Value
L Minibatch size 100
Learning rate Local likelihood optimiser initial learning rate 2.0
Nsteps Number of local optimisation steps per PVI update 25
Damping factor PVI damping factor to apply to local likelihood updates 0.1
Table 2: Hyperparameter settings used for the PVI algorithm.
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D.2 DP-PVI Hyperparameter settings
Hyperparameter Description Value
C `2 clipping bound 75
σ Effective noise scale 5
q Minibatch sample proportion 0.02
Learning rate Local likelihood optimiser initial learning rate 0.5
Nsteps Number of local optimisation steps per PVI update 25
Damping factor PVI damping factor to apply to local likelihood updates 0.1
Table 3: Hyperparameter settings used for the DP-PVI algorithm.
D.3 Global VI Hyperparameter settings
Hyperparameter Description Value
L Minibatch size 100
Learning rate Local likelihood optimiser initial learning rate 0.05
Table 4: Hyperparameter settings used for the global VI algorithm.
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E Additional Results
E.1 Comparison between Global VI and PVI
-3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 0 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95 1.0
Class Imbalance ( )
0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.9
0.95
Si
ze
 Im
ba
la
ce
 (ρ
)
A
D
B
C
∆ Test Accuracy
-3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 0 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95 1.0
Class Imbalance ( )
0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.9
0.95
A
D
B
C
∆ Test Per-Point Log Likelihood
0 500 1000
0.4
0.6
0.8
Te
st
 A
cc
ur
ac
y
0 500 1000
PVI Iterations
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
Te
st
 P
er
-P
oi
nt
 
 L
og
 L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
PVI
Global VI
0 500 1000
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 500 1000
PVI Iterations
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0 500 1000
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 500 1000
PVI Iterations
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0 500 1000
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 500 1000
PVI Iterations
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
0 2000 4000
Global VI Iterations
0 2000 4000
A
0 2000 4000
Global VI Iterations
0 2000 4000
D
0 2000 4000
Global VI Iterations
0 2000 4000
B
0 2000 4000
Global VI Iterations
0 2000 4000
C
Figure 3: Upper: mean performance difference, averaged across five random seeds across the final
ten iterations, between the PVI and global VI algorithms for both test accuracy and held out log
likelihood for different values of κ and ρ, as defined in Appendix C. Blank cells indicate invalid
settings. Lower: representative training curves for chosen values of κ and ρ.
E.2 Tabulated results
Dataset A B CTest
Accuracy (%)
Average Log
Likelihood
Test
Accuracy (%)
Average Log
Likelihood
Test
Accuracy (%)
Average Log
Likelihood
PVI 85.23± 0.05 −0.3181± 0.0003 85.15± 0.15 −0.3216± 0.0030 85.13± 0.05 −0.3193± 0.0007
Global VI 85.21± 0.08 −0.3184± 0.0002 78.76± 0.13 −0.7006± 0.0105 53.96± 0.78 −1.1997± 0.0438
DP-PVI (max = 0.50) 84.57± 0.00 −0.3439± 0.0000 84.43± 0.00 −0.3379± 0.0000 81.83± 0.00 −0.4218± 0.0000
DP-PVI (max = 0.75) 84.78± 0.00 −0.3372± 0.0000 84.87± 0.00 −0.3332± 0.0000 82.38± 0.00 −0.4130± 0.0000
DP-PVI (max = 1.00) 85.02± 0.15 −0.3332± 0.0018 84.94± 0.14 −0.3323± 0.0017 82.46± 0.00 −0.4070± 0.0000
Table 5: Test accuracy and average log likelihood across different dataset distributions for the PVI,
global VI and DP-PVI algorithms, considering different max.
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E.3 Distribution A (Homogenous)
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Figure 4: Dataset A (homogenous) Results. Left: test set accuracy. Right: test set average log
likelihood. Upper: performance as a function of parameter communications. Note that the x-axis
scale is different for global VI and PVI. Lower: privacy-utility tradeoff. PVI and Global VI perform
similarly on homogenously distributed data. DP-PVI reaches marginly lower performance in this case.
Increasing max improves performance as each client is able to participate in additional communication
rounds.
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E.4 Distribution B (Inhomogenous)
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Figure 5: Dataset B (inhomogenous) Results. Left: test set accuracy. Right: test set average
log likelihood. Upper: performance as a function of parameter communications. Note that the
x-axis scale is different for global VI and PVI. Lower: privacy-utility tradeoff. PVI (and DP-PVI)
performs significantly better than global VI in terms of test set accuracy and performance. DP-PVI
with moderate privacy guarantees achieves performance similar to non-private PVI. Increasing max
improves performance as each client is able to participate in additional communication rounds.
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